Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing? by Brown, Alasdair & Yang, Fuyu
Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing?∗
Alasdair Brown†
University of East Anglia
Fuyu Yang‡
University of East Anglia
May 19, 2015
∗An earlier draft of this paper was circulated under the title ‘A Model of the Favourite-Longshot Bias on a
Betting Exchange’. We would like to thank Fabrizio Adriani, Emilio Barucci, Bibhas Saha, Michela Verardo,
and audiences at the International Conference on Gambling Studies at Nottingham Trent University in
April 2011, and the British Horse Racing Authority, for comments. This work also benefited greatly from
suggestions from Leo Kahane (the Editor) and two anonymous referees. All remaining errors are our own.
Part of the research presented in this paper was carried out on the High Performance Computing Cluster
supported by the Research and Specialist Computing Support service at the University of East Anglia.
†Corresponding Author. School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.. Email:
alasdair.brown@uea.ac.uk Tel: 44 1603 591131
‡School of Economics, University of East Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, U.K.. Email: fuyu.yang@uea.ac.uk
Tel: 44 1603 591058
1
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Abstract
Betting exchanges allow punters to bet on a horse to lose a race. This, many argue,
has opened up the sport to a new form of corruption, where races will be deliberately
lost in order to profit from betting. We examine whether anecdotal evidence of the fixing
of horses to lose - of which there are many examples - is indicative of wider corruption.
Following a ‘forensic economics’ approach, we build an asymmetric information model
of exchange betting, and take it to betting data on 9,560 races run in 2013/14. We find
no evidence of the widespread corruption of horse racing by the betting exchanges.
JEL Classification: G14, K13
Keywords: corruption, horse racing, betting exchanges, asymmetric information
1 Introduction
Betting exchanges, such as Betfair and Betdaq in the U.K., mimic the structure of financial
exchanges, by allowing bettors to take long or short positions on bets. For example, bettors
can ‘back’ a horse (bet on a horse to win a race) or ‘lay’ a horse (bet on a horse to lose).
Punters who bet on horses to lose assume a role that, prior to the establishment of betting
exchanges in the year 2000, had for centuries been the exclusive purview of bookmakers. By
facilitating such ‘person-to-person’ betting, the exchanges have radically altered the nature
of betting in the U.K.. Smith et al. (2006) find that transaction costs are much lower on the
exchanges than they are with bookmakers. Betfair, the largest of the exchanges, now hosts
more than 1.2 billion bets a year across a range of sports.1
This upheaval in the betting industry has not been without controversy. Bookmakers,
regulators and others within the industry have argued that betting exchanges threaten the
integrity of horse racing. The argument is that by allowing bettors to profit from a horse losing
a race, exchanges encourage jockeys, trainers and owners to deliberately lose races. While
fixing a horse to win a race is tricky - as it requires the cooperation of all other participants in
the race - fixing a horse to lose only requires the actions of those connected to one horse. This
1http://corporate.betfair.com/about-us/a-betting-revolution.aspx
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has caused many to doubt whether all horses are being run on their merits. As the trainer
Mark Johnston said - in an article titled ‘Does the existence of exchanges corrupt sport? -
‘exchanges give an opportunity to cheat that wasn’t there before their arrival’.2 Concerns
for the integrity of racing have also, at one time or another, been raised by regulators in
Australia, France, Japan and California as an argument against the legalisation of betting
exchanges (O’Connor (2014)).
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence to support the view that betting exchanges have
facilitated the corruption of horse racing. In August 2004, Fergal Lynch deliberately stopped
his horse, Bond City, in a race at Ripon. His actions were at the behest of the horse’s owner
Miles Rogers, who had laid the horse to lose on Betfair. Lynch was banned from racing
for life, but recently returned to the track.3 In 2010-11, the jockey Andrew Heffernan was
part of a conspiracy to deliberately lose 9 all-weather races, and profit by betting on each
horse to lose on the exchanges. This conspiracy, which also involved a number of professional
footballers as co-conspirators, resulted in lengthy bans for all those involved.4 In January
2012 Steven Gagan, a jump jockey, leapt off the favourite Kickahead while in the lead of a race
at Musselburgh. Again, connections of this horse had laid the horse to lose on the exchanges.5
Many more cases can be found on the British Horse Racing Authority’s disciplinary hearings
page.6
How widespread is this practice? Have betting exchanges, by facilitating lay betting and
allowing for losers to profit, inadvertently corrupted horse racing? In this paper we analyse
whether the examples of corruption described above are just isolated incidents, or signs of a
wider problem in the sport.
Answering such a question is difficult as corruption, by its very nature, is hidden from
view. Our approach is to develop an asymmetric information model of betting exchange
2‘Does the existence of betting exchanges corrupt sport?’, Mark Johnston and Mark Davies, The Guardian,
12th December 2007.
3‘BHA treats punters as mugs by letting disgraced Fergal Lynch ride again’, Greg Wood, The Guardian,
10th August 2014.
4‘Chopra guilty of race-fixing scam’, Chris McGrath, The Telegraph, 25th January 2013.
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activity and compare it with pricing data from Betfair. Our model is based on Glosten
and Milgrom (1985), who had New York Stock Exchange dealer markets in mind, and Shin
(1993), who analysed traditional U.K. bookmaker markets. We adapt these models to fit
the characteristics of betting exchanges, where a binary asset is traded on a limit order
book, and where punters can back a horse to win, or lay a horse to lose. Our set-up is
simple. A Bayesian market-maker (who voluntarily provides quoted back and lay odds)
trades bets with a population of informed bettors (who have fixed the outcome of the race)
and uninformed noise bettors, who trade randomly. The market-maker quotes back and
lay odds dependent on her unbiased prior estimation of the horse’s win probability (which
approximates the empirical probability), and dependent on her estimation of the relative
proportion of informed and uninformed bettors in the population. If a back order is received,
the market-maker revises up her beliefs of the horse’s win probability (as long as there are
some informed in the population), and if a lay order is received the market-maker revises
down her estimate of the horse’s win probability. This creates an adverse selection spread
between back and lay quotes.
The empirical implications of the model are as follows. If there is adverse selection - i.e.
if the market-maker can be ‘adversely-selected’ by bettors that have fixed a horse to win
or lose - then back bet prices (odds) will overestimate the probability that a horse wins,
and lay bet prices will underestimate the probability that a horse wins. This is because the
market-maker recoups the losses to the informed with gains from the noise bettors. More
importantly, if betting exchanges have corrupted horse racing by allowing for cheats to fix
horses to lose, then lay bets should overestimate a horse’s win probability by more than the
back bets underestimate the horse’s win probability. This is because there is greater adverse
selection risk associated with lay bets than with back bets, as it is easier to fix a horse to
lose than it is to fix a horse to win. If, on the other hand, back and lay bet prices deviate
from the empirical win probabilities by equal amounts (i.e. adverse selection arises equally
from backers and layers) - or both back and lay bets closely correspond with empirical win
probabilities - then there is little to suggest that betting exchanges have corrupted horse
racing.
We compare this model to pricing data from 9,560 U.K. horse races run in 2013 and 2014.
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We use more than 225 million observations of the Betfair limit order book to construct data
on the direction and volume of all bets placed in the 20 minute window before each race. This
constitutes more than 80% of all betting volume and involves more than 60 million separate
trades. Crucially, we divide up these trades into those initiated in the form of back orders,
and those initiated in the form of lay orders. We then construct the trade-weighted average
back and lay price for each horse in each race. This gives a very precise representation of the
prices at which back and lay bets are executed. We find that both back and lay bet prices
closely track the empirical win probabilities of horses. In other words, there does not appear
to be an adverse selection component to prices in this market. This implies that bettors
in this market believe that the events described earlier are isolated incidents, rather than a
widespread phenomenon that has corrupted horse racing.
This paper falls into a type of research recently labelled ‘forensic economics’ (Zitzewitz
(2012)). As with other examples of this work, we ‘size the extent of an activity about which
there had been only anecdotal evidence and provide insight into where it is more prevalent
and why’.7 While ‘wrongdoers may cover their tracks well enough to fool traditional forensic
investigators, ... they leave distortions in the data that economic analysis can detect.8 An
example of this approach is found in DellaVigna and Ferrera (2010). The authors examine
the stock prices of arms companies in the aftermath of conflict intensifications. The aim
is to identify whether a given company is involved in the illicit selling of arms. The idea
is that while investigators may not be able to pin down, or definitively prove, illegal arms
sales, financial market participants have good incentives to accurately predict whether, on
the balance of probabilities, a given firm is involved. If the stock price spikes in the aftermath
of a ramp-up in conflict, this suggests that the firm is, in some way, shepherding arms to the
conflict region.
An example from sport is the work of Wolfers (2006) and Bernhardt and Heston (2010),
who examine ‘point-shaving’ in NBA basketball. This is the practice by which heavily
favoured teams deliberately win by just less than the quoted spread predicts. This allows the
team to attain their objectives (to win the match), but also allows illicit gamblers, involved
7Zitzewitz (2012) p. 732.
8Zitzewitz (2012) p. 732.
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in the fixing, the opportunity to profit. Empirical evidence suggests a clustering of results
where favourites win by just less than the predicted spread, but there is some debate as to
whether this is due to deliberate point-shaving or simply an unexpected (from the point of
view of the bookie) tailing off in effort from the better team as they close in on the win.
In a similar vein to ours, Reade and Akie (2013) use football betting data to look for signs
of match-fixing. Their idea is that bookmakers have good incentives to sniff out potential
fixes, as they will lose money if on the wrong side of the bets. Therefore, match-fixing can
potentially be identified by comparing the bookies’ odds to the odds produced by prediction
models based on public information. When these odds differ substantially, it may be because
bookies have spotted a potential fix. Our approach is similar. We expect those providing
liquidity (quoting back and lay odds) on the exchange to have a good idea of the level of
adverse selection in the market. If they underestimate the level of informed trading, they will
lose money to the fixers. If they overestimate the level of informed trading, they will quote
uncompetitive prices and be unable to secure trade. Therefore, we can infer the frequency of
fixing - in both back and lay bet terms - from the prices that are quoted and executed.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
generate predictions for the pricing of back and lay bets. In Section 3 we describe the data
and compare the actual pricing of bets to those predicted by the model. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
In this section we present a Glosten and Milgrom-type market microstructure model of betting
on an exchange.9 The central result of these models, when applied to any asset market, is
that bid/ask prices deviate from the fundamental value of an asset when there is asymmetric
information. The market-maker, whether providing liquidity contractually or voluntarily, will
use the bid-ask spread to offset losses to informed traders with gains from uninformed noise
traders. The magnitude of the bid-ask spread is increasing in the proportion of informed
traders in the population.
9Easley and O’Hara (1987) extend the Glosten and Milgrom model to account for heterogeneous trade
sizes, and Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) include short-selling constraints.
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A betting exchange, such as Betfair in the U.K., provides a public limit order book for bets
on sporting and related events. Bettors are allowed to take both a long or short position on
a particular outcome; consequently those providing liquidity will quote back odds (where the
opposing bettor places a stake and receives the odds multiplied by the stake if the outcome
occurs) and lay odds (where the opposing bettor receives the stake but is liable for the odds
multiplied by the stake if the outcome occurs).
Consider the following model of exchange betting. A market-maker trades a bet on a
horse to win a race, where the bet has a fundamental value of either 0 (if the horse loses) or
1 (if the horse wins). This bet is traded with a population of bettors, of whom a proportion
µB are informed about the winner of the race, and a proportion µL are informed that a given
horse will lose. The informed bet in a manner consistent with their private information, i.e.
backing a horse when it will win, and laying it when it will lose.10 Bettors can be informed
due to the collection of private information (i.e. by studying a horse’s form in detail) or by
the fixing of races. As noted in the introduction, fixing the winner of a race may require the
co-operation of a number of competitors; losing a race does not. This means that µB ≤ µL.
The remainder of the betting population are uninformed about the outcome of the race.
Consequently they randomise their bets, betting on the horse to win, with a back bet, with
probability 0.5, and betting on the horse to lose, with a lay bet, with probability 0.5.11
Prior to any bet, the market-maker assesses the probability of the horse winning as
λ ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that this prior approximates the empirical probability that the horse
wins (i.e. the market-maker has unbiased beliefs). In each instant, a bettor is randomly drawn
to bet one unit with the market-maker. The posterior probability that the market-maker
assigns to the horse winning is determined by her own prior assessment, the proportion of
bettors that are informed that a horse is going to win, and the proportion that are informed
10We assume that the proportion of informed traders is exogenous. For a model where the decision to fix
a sporting event and betting market prices are determined endogenously, see Bag and Saha (2011).
11We have assumed - as is typical with these type of microstructure models - that informed traders consume
liquidity via market orders, rather than provide liquidity via limit orders. The results of the model hold as
long as informed traders predominantly use market orders. As the informed want to ensure their trade
is executed - and such a guarantee can only be made with a market order - this should be a reasonable
assumption.
6
Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing?
that a horse will lose.
Applying Bayes’ rule, and simplifying, the market-maker’s posterior probability of the
horse winning, after a back bet, is
λ(1 + µB)
1 + µB(2λ− 1) (1)
and the market-maker’s posterior probability of the horse winning, after a lay bet, is
λ(1− µL)
1 + µL(1− 2λ) (2)
Both back and lay odds are set so as to be regret-free, which means that they incorporate the
information contained in the direction of the last order. Therefore, converting the posterior
probabilities into odds, we have back odds of
B = 1/( λ(1 + µB)1 + µB(2λ− 1))− 1 (3)
and lay odds of
L = 1/( λ(1− µL)1 + µL(1− 2λ))− 1 (4)
In Figure 1 we plot the implications of this model for the relationship between implied
win probabilities - inferred from the betting odds, and measured in Equations (1) and (2)
- and actual win probabilities. For this example, we assume that µB = µL = 0.2. In other
words, fixing a horse to win is equally as likely as fixing a horse to lose, and 20% of the
betting population are informed of the fix. In both panels of Figure 1 we plot implied win
probability against actual win probability. Implied win probability is then re-created on the
y-axis in orange. This implied win probability is then compared to actual win probabilities,
displayed in the form of a smooth green scatterplot. For back bets, horses win less frequently
than the odds suggest. This is because the market-maker will be picked off by the informed
fixers 20% of the time, and therefore must recoup these losses from the uninformed traders
as they randomise their bets. For lay bets there is a symmetrical and opposite relationship:
the odds underestimate the frequency with which the horse actually wins. In both cases, the
largest difference between implied and actual win probabilities is for bets of around evens (or
implied win probabilities near 0.5). This is a characteristic of Bayesian updating. For low
or high implied win probabilities the prior is strong, and therefore less is learned from the
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direction of bettor’s trade. Around 0.5, however, the prior is weak, and therefore the effect
on the market-maker’s beliefs of a given trade is greater.
By way of comparison, in Figure 2 we plot the relationship between implied and actual
win probabilities when there is no adverse selection (i.e. µB = µL = 0). In this example horse
racing is clean and there is no fixing of horses to win or lose. For both back and lay bets, the
actual win probabilities closely correspond with the implied win probabilities inferred from
the betting odds. The market-maker has no need to recoup losses from uninformed bettors
as there are no informed fixers to lose to. Drawing on the patterns in Figures 1 and 2, we
can design empirical tests to establish whether betting exchanges, by facilitating lay betting,
have corrupted horse racing. If the fixing of horses to lose is now prevalent, we should expect
that actual win probabilities will depart from implied win probabilities to a greater extent
for lay bets than for back bets. If there is widespread fixing of horses to lose, a regression
of actual win probabilities on implied win probabilities, for lay bets, will have a significantly
positive intercept coefficient (as illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1), as horses win
much more frequently than their odds imply. It is this idea that we will test in Section 3.
Before we proceed, it is worth clarifying one point about the model. This is a model of
informed trading on the exchange. Bettors can be informed because they have fixed the race,
or because they have simply acquired private information. Therefore, if we observe that lay
bets have much greater adverse selection inherent in their prices, this is merely consistent
with, rather than proof of, the widespread fixing of horses to lose. Lay bets may also have a
greater adverse selection component because it is easier to acquire information that a horse
is poor and will lose, rather than acquire information that a horse will definitely outperform
the competition and win. If, as may be the case, we observe that there is little or no adverse
selection associated with lay bets - consistent with our simulated prices in Figure 2 - then
this would suggest that betting exchanges have not led to the corruption of horse racing.
3 Data
We collected data on 9,560 U.K. horse races run between the 24th of March 2013 and the
19th March 2014 from Fracsoft, a third-party provider of Betfair limit order book data. In
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contrast to previous studies which have just used transaction data (e.g. Smith et al. (2006)),
we require samples of the limit order book because we need to distinguish between back
and lay initiated orders. The data includes second-by-second observations of the best back
and lay quotes (odds), plus the last transacted price and volume each second. This data is
collected for 20 minutes prior to each race for both the win market and the place market
(though certain place markets are missing from the Fracsoft database). In the place market,
punters speculate on which horses will finish in top-ranked positions (normally 2nd to 4th,
but depending on the number of runners), but will not win the race. This data is also used
in a contemporaneous paper (Brown and Yang 2014) which looks, more generally, at the role
of speculative trade in asset mispricing, and studies both the pre-race and in-running trading
periods.
To classify back and lay initiated orders we use a variation of the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm. An order occurs if the total matched volume for a bet at time t is greater than
the total matched volume at time t− 1. We then classify the order as a back order, betting
on the horse to win/place, if the last matched price at time t is closer to the best quoted back
odds at time t − 1 than it is to the best quoted lay odds at time t − 1. If the last matched
price is closer to the last quoted lay price, then we classify the order as a lay order, betting
on the horse not to win/place. This algorithm can classify all orders except those that occur
precisely at the middle of the spread at time t− 1.
Using this method we turn approximately 225 million observations of the limit order book
- across the 9,560 races and for both win and place markets - into detailed records of all bets
placed. For each bet, we then sum the back and lay orders, and calculate the total back and
lay volume and the weighted average back and lay price (described in implied win probability
terms where implied win probability=1/(Odds + 1)). Table 1 summarises this information.
From the top panel of this table, we can see that back initiated bets constitute, on average,
greater volume than lay initiated bets. The average trading volume is more than 18,000 GBP
for back bets, and just over 13,000 GBP for lay bets. The highest trading volume in this
20 minute pre-race window is 1.76 million GBP for back bets, and 2.4 million GBP for lay
bets. This is for one bet, on one horse, in one market. We can also see that there is a spread
in implied win probabilities between back and lay bets. Back bets have average implied win
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probabilities of 0.21 (just less than 4-1 in odds), and lay bets average 0.2. This spread is
in part mechanical, as without a spread, back bet quotes would immediately execute with
lay bet quotes. Our job later will be to establish the extent to which this spread is due to
greater adverse selection in lay betting. Finally, in the middle and bottom panels we break
down the summary statistics into the win and place markets. The win market hosts greater
betting volume for both back and lay betting.
We marry the Fracsoft data with data from Betfair on the winners and placers in each
race.12 Betfair also provide data on the amount of traded volume and the average price for
each bet. We do not use this data because we need to distinguish between back and lay
initiated orders. However, by comparing our own measure of trading volume constructed
from the Fracsoft data, with the Betfair in-house measure, we estimate that at least 80.4% of
pre-race trading takes place in the 20 minutes immediately preceding each race. Moreover,
we find a correlation of 0.98 between the total amount of volume that we detect for a bet
(both back and lay initiated) and the pre-race volume for that bet listed by Betfair. These
two points give us confidence that the prices we describe are a good representation of the
prices traded on Betfair.
Our first look at whether betting exchanges have corrupted horse racing can be found in
Figure 3. We plot the implied win probability - as inferred from back and lay betting odds
- against actual win probabilities (calculated as the average of the win indicator). We round
implied win probability to 2 decimal places to ensure that we have large enough buckets of
bets to calculate smooth actual win probabilities. We also pool win and place bets to ensure a
large spread of implied win probabilities. Judging by the green scatters in Figure 3, it would
appear that implied win probabilities calculated from both back and lay bet prices closely
shadow actual win probabilities. In other words, bets win/lose about as often as the odds
imply. On the face of it this supports a parameterization similar to Figure 2, where there are
no informed fixers for back bets or lay bets. In other words, there is little to suggest at this
stage that betting exchanges, by allowing for lay betting, have encouraged those competing to
deliberately lose. The only area where there is some discrepancy between actual and implied
win probabilities is for the extreme favourites (i.e. those with very high implied win/place
12This can be found here: http://www.betfairpromo.com/betfairsp/prices/index.php.
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probabilities). These horses seem to win more often than the odds suggest, both for back
and lay bets. Having said that, part of this is due to the limited number of observations up
in this top right corner. In general there is more noise here than there is for lower implied
win/place probabilities where there are many more observations.
Another way to check the relationship between actual and implied win probabilities is
with a lowess (locally weighted scatterplot smoothing) technique. This works by running
regressions of the win indicator variable on implied win probabilities for different subsets of
the data at a time. In Figure 4 we display the results of this technique for both back and lay
bets. For these examples, a bandwidth of 0.8 is chosen. This means that 80% of the data is
used for each local regression. This is the default option in many statistical packages, but
similar results are found when we vary the bandwidth. Using this technique we find that
actual and implied win probabilities are indistinguishable from each other for both back and
lay bets. In other words, there is, again, little to suggest that there is an adverse selection
component to either back or lay bet prices.
To more formally test whether there is greater adverse selection associated with lay bets,
we estimate the following simple regression:
yi = β0 + β1xi + i (5)
yi is an indicator variable, equalling 1 if the horse won (or placed, depending on the
market), xi is the implied win probability inferred from the odds, and i is an error term.
This linear probability model, estimated by OLS, is sometimes used to test for the favourite-
longshot bias, where returns for betting on favourites exceed those for betting on longshots
(see Reade (2014) for example). In our study - where our later results show no favourite-
longshot bias - we are primarily interested in the intercept coefficient β0. In the presence of
adverse selection, the intercept should be negative for back bets, and positive for lay bets.
Figure 1, based on our model, illustrates this point. Moreover, if adverse selection is more
pronounced for lay bets, the absolute magnitude of this coefficient should be greater for lay
bets than it is for back bets. This is because market-makers will revise their beliefs to a
greater degree for lay bets, as these types of orders are more likely to stem from informed
11
Have Betting Exchanges Corrupted Horse Racing?
trading (after a horse is fixed to lose).13
In Table 2 we present the results of this regression for the full sample, and also broken
down for the win and place markets. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent.14 On
the face of it, the model appears to fit the data well. The estimated coefficient for β1 is
insignificantly different from 1, showing an approximate 1:1 relationship between actual and
implied win probabilities. This is the case for both back and lay bets, and for both win and
place markets. More importantly, we find that the intercept term is insignificantly different
from 0 (at least at the 5% level) for both back and lay bets. This suggests that there is no
adverse selection component to either back or lay prices. Moreover, for the pooled win and
place bets (in the top panel), the absolute magnitude of the intercept is smaller for lay bets
(.0002082) than it is for back bets (-.0018182). Therefore, if anything, there is arguably more
adverse selection for back bets than there is for lay bets. This strongly suggests that betting
exchanges have not become a hive for the fixing of horses to lose.
One possibility is that the fixing of horses to lose is concentrated in low-grade races where
the incentives for winning are smaller. This concern was recently raised by the Timeform
organisation, a horse racing information company: ‘the rules requiring horses to be ridden on
their merits are regularly flouted...At times nowadays, at some of the more far-flung outposts
of jump racing, it seems as if [stewards] are hardly applying [the rules] at all.’15 While we
cannot identify low grade racing from our data-set, we can identify those races which, as a
whole, attract little betting volume. These will tend to be lower grade races at such far-flung
outposts. In Table 3, we break down races into those with high and low betting volume. We
calculate the total back and lay volume for each race, and a race is classified as high volume
if it has volume greater than the median race in the data, and is classified as low volume
13We could alternatively use a logit specification, to recognise the 0/1 nature of our dependent variable.
Or, we could use a conditional logit, to additionally recognise the correlation between the dependent variable
within each race. The problem with these models is that our coefficient of interest is the intercept, which
would be negative for both back and lay bets in a logit model, and absent in a conditional logit model.
14We have observations for each horse, in each market, in each race. This raises the possibility of cor-
related residuals within races. Similar results to those displayed in the paper - where standard errors are
heteroskedasticity-consistent - are found when standard errors are also clustered at the race-level.
15‘British Horseracing Authority stewards accused of missing non-triers’, Chris Cook, The Guardian, 1st
February 2012.
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otherwise. This process is carried out separately for win and place markets, as volume differs
substantially across the two markets. We then carry out the same regression described in
Equation (5) for these sub-samples. We find little evidence consistent with lay bet fixing in
low volume races. The intercept coefficient is insignificant for lay bets in low volume races,
in both the win and place markets. Actual win probabilities closely correspond with implied
win probabilities, suggesting that bettors do not pay a premium consistent with widespread
fixing of horses to lose.
One other possibility is that adverse selection for lay bets is only detectable when a large,
disproportionate, amount of money is placed on a horse to lose. A group of individuals are
only likely to risk the punishment of cheating if they can profit handsomely; to do so they
must bet a large amount. With this in mind, we calculated the net volume - which is the
total back volume minus the total lay volume - on each horse, in each market (win or place),
in each race. While some horses may attract a large number of lay bets, this may be offset by
a large number of back bets. We therefore want to know what is an abnormally high level of
lay betting, which depends not only the amount bet both for and against that horse, but also
on the amount bet for and against other horses in the same race. Once we had calculated the
net volume for each horse, we then identified those horses in the bottom 10% and 25% of net
volume in their race. If abnormally large amounts of lay volume do correlate with the fixing
of horses to lose, we would expect these groups of horses to win more often than their odds
suggest.16 To this end, we repeat the analysis of Table 2, but this time with our sub-sample
of horses with abnormally large laying volume. These new results are in Table 4. In line with
our earlier results, we find an insignificant intercept coefficient for lay bets, and the fact that
this coefficient is negative indicates that these horses, if anything, actually win slightly less
often than their odds suggest. This is the case both for the bottom 10% of net volume within
each race (in the top panel), and the bottom 25% of net volume (in the bottom panel). In
short, a look at extreme lay volume does not turn up any evidence of corruption.
Our next piece of analysis focuses on the number of runners within a race. The ease
16It is possible, of course, to end up in these sub-samples purely by attracting fewer back bets than others
in the same race, rather than attracting more lay bets; however, this is not the case for the majority of horses
in these sub-samples.
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with which the winner of a race can be fixed likely depends on the number of runners. The
more runners there are, the less easy it is to fix, as exercising control over more and more
runners becomes impractical. Fixing a horse to lose, however, is less sensitive to the number
of runners, as the fixer only has to control one horse. Similarly, suppose a punter has fixed a
horse to lose, but wants to hide their activity so instead of laying the horse they back all of
the horses’ competitors. When the number of runners becomes large, however, this becomes
costly (transaction costs are paid on each bet), and therefore lay-fixing in large fields (with
many runners) will likely be enacted exclusively through lay bets not back bets. Following
these two arguments, it is possible that the degree of adverse selection for lay bets, relative
to adverse selection for back bets, is more pronounced for large races. With this in mind, we
broke the sample approximately in half, and looked at races with less than 10 runners, and
races with 10 or more runners. In Table 5 we present the results of this analysis. If lay-fixing
is widespread, for large races we should observe a greater difference between the implied and
actual win probabilities for lay bets than for back bets. On the contrary, for races with 10
or more runners, we find that the intercept term is insignificant for both back and lay bets,
and that it is, again, the back bet prices which depart to a greater extent from the empirical
probabilities. This indicates, if anything, that there is a sliver more adverse selection in back
bets than in lay bets, even in races where it is hardest to fix the winner.
Our final tests break down the full sample into implied win probability sub-samples. From
Figure 3 there appeared to be some underestimation of the win probabilities of extreme
favourites. Much of this appeared to be due to the limited number of observations, but it is
worth checking if this underestimation is statistically significant. With this in mind, in Table
6 we consider four separate sub-samples of implied win probability. We can see from the
number of observations that there are many more bets with implied win/place probabilities
less than 0.25 (112,186 for back bets and 113,580 for lay bets) than there are for implied
win probabilities greater than 0.75 (2697 for back bets and 2583 for lay bets). The intercept
terms for these lay bets is large (.1015566) but is not statistically significant, giving weight
to the explanation that discrepancies between actual and implied win probabilities in Figure
3 were due to the small number of observations. Moreover, the intercept term is actually
bigger for back bets (.1165823) when, if adverse selection were the cause, we would expect
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back bets to have a negative intercept coefficient. In short, our analysis has turned up no
evidence that adverse selection is pronounced for lay bets, and therefore no evidence that
betting exchanges have brought about the corruption of horse racing.
Before we conclude, we will discuss a number of caveats with our analysis. Firstly, it is
possible that even substantial levels of corruption may be difficult to detect in the data. For
example, suppose that 1 in 10 races are aﬄicted by competitors deliberating losing. Within
this 1 race, suppose that this aﬄiction only relates to 1 out of the 10 runners. If this is the
case, adverse selection only affects 1 in 100 bets, and such a small effect is therefore likely to
be economically and statistically insignificant. However, even if the ‘treatment’ is tiny - and
only affects a small fraction of bets - we might expect there to be a slight indication that
adverse selection is more of a threat for lay bets than back bets. Yet, our point estimates
for our intercept terms suggest that, if anything, there is greater adverse selection inherent
in back bet prices than in lay bet prices. This is the case even in sub-samples - such as
for low-grade races, and for horses with abnormally large lay volumes - where we might
expect lay-fixing to at least be more pronounced (if still not statistically and economically
significant).
A second caveat is that our work relates to only one year of racing (in part due to the
number of order book observations that even a small number of races generate). We chose
a recent window in order to answer the question of whether horse racing was recently, or
currently, corrupted. It is possible, however, that the pricing of bets in earlier years of the
betting exchanges may indicate greater levels of adverse selection for lay bets. Our final
caveat is that the development of betting exchanges may have necessitated elevated levels of
expenditure on race-fixing detection. We are aware of systems that the British Horse Racing
Authority have in place, in concert with Betfair, which aim to create a clear audit trail to
detect the fixing of horses to lose. It is possible that without such expenditures, the invention
of betting exchanges may have had substantial adverse consequences for the integrity of horse
racing.
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4 Conclusion
Betting exchanges have shaken up the way that sports betting takes place in the U.K.. Rather
than relying on the odds offered by bookmakers - with their decades of experience and high-
street presence - bettors can now offer bets amongst themselves. There is evidence that this
has substantially driven down the cost of betting (Smith et al. (2006)). Nevertheless, there
is the suspicion that this may have come at a grave cost for the most prominent sport for
betting, horse racing. Incidences of horses being fixed to lose - in order that their connections
can profit from lay betting on the exchanges - are numerous. This has fed the impression
that there is a new widespread form of corruption aﬄicting horse racing.
Measuring the extent to which anecdotal evidence of corruption is indicative of a more
widespread problem is, of course, difficult. Wrongdoers take steps to hide their activities, in
order to avoid punishment. Our approach in this paper, therefore, is to build an asymmetric
information model of betting exchange activity and then take it to the data. The central idea
in our model is that if the deliberate fixing of horses to lose is widespread, then horses subject
to lay bets should win much more often than their odds imply. This is because counterparties
to any corrupt bettors must recoup their losses from other unsuspecting noise bettors. When
we examined a recent year of betting exchange data, however, there was little sign of adverse
selection in the pricing of lay bets. Actual win probabilities closely corresponded with implied
win probabilities, suggesting that the examples of horses being fixed to lose are not signs of
a pervasive problem in the sport.
A note of caution should nevertheless be struck. Horse race betting is big business in the
U.K.. In our 1-year sample, bets with a total value exceeding 6 billion GBP were struck.
The rewards from fixing horse races are therefore great. It is also undoubtedly true that it is
operationally easier to fix a horse to lose a race, than it is to fix a horse to win. We hope that
the simple theoretical and empirical framework presented in this paper will help in detecting
whether the fixing of races becomes a problem in the future.
In addition, the method we use in this paper may be useful for detecting corruption in
other sports, such as golf, cycling and Formula 1. As in each of these sports it is easier to fix
a loser than it is to fix a winner, we can examine differences in returns to back and lay bets
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to see if betting market-induced corruption has materialised. While racing and individual
sports with many competitors are the most obvious application, there is also the potential
to apply a similar method in other sports. For example, a comparable method may be useful
for determining corruption in so-called ‘spot-betting’ markets. In cricket, punters can wager
on the number and timing of ‘no-balls’, which are non-legitimate deliveries which lead to a
run being awarded to the opposing batting side. There may be differences in the returns to
betting on the number of no-balls in a single over - which is in the control of a single bowler
- and the number of no-balls in a series of overs, where responsibility is spread across more
than one bowler. In much the same way that horse racing fixers will find it easier to fix a
horse to lose than to win (as they just need to control one horse), cricket fixers will find it
easier to fix the number of no-balls in a single over than in a series of overs (as they just
need to control one bowler). This should depress returns for bets on a single over - as other
bettors aim to recoup money lost to the fixers - relative to bets on a series of overs.
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(a) µB = 0.2
(b) µL = 0.2
Figure 1: The model’s predicted relationship between the implied win probability of a bet
(captured by the orange straight line) and the actual win probability of the bet (captured by
the green scatter plot), in the presence of adverse selection. The top panel contains back bets,
and the bottom panel contains lay bets. For both types of bet, the proportion of informed
bettors in the population is assumed to be 20% (i.e. µB = µL = 0.2). If there is adverse
selection - as is the case here - the horse subject to a back (lay) bet wins less (more) often
than the odds imply.
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(a) µB = 0
(b) µL = 0
Figure 2: The model’s predicted relationship between the implied win probability of a bet
(captured by the orange straight line) and the actual win probability of the bet (captured by
the green scatter plot), with no adverse selection. The top panel contains back bets, and the
bottom panel contains lay bets. For both types of bet, the proportion of informed bettors in
the population is assumed to be 0 (i.e. µB = µL = 0). If there is no adverse selection - as is
the case here - the horse subject to a back (lay) bet wins equally as often as the odds imply.
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Figure 3: The empirical relationship between the implied win probability of a bet (captured
by the orange straight line) and the actual win probability of the bet (captured by the green
scatter plot). The top panel contains back bets, and the bottom panel contains lay bets.
Implied Win Probability=1/(Odds + 1). Implied win probability is rounded to 2 decimal
places, to create large enough buckets to compare with actual win probabilities. For both
back and lay bets, the data are consistent with no adverse selection (i.e. µB = µL = 0)
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Figure 4: A Lowess of the empirical relationship between the implied win probability of a bet
(captured by the orange straight line) and the actual win probability of the bet (captured by
the green scatter plot). The top panel contains back bets, and the bottom panel contains lay
bets. Implied Win Probability=1/(Odds+1). A bandwidth of 0.8 is used for the Lowess. For
both back and lay bets, the data are consistent with no adverse selection (i.e. µb = µl = 0).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All (Win & Place Markets)
Total Trading Volume Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 169813 18.36734 40.43982 .002 1759.004
Lay-initiated Bets 170141 13.13567 31.51797 .002 2395.698
Implied Win Probability Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 169813 .2133752 .1902648 .0010101 .9826381
Lay-initiated Bets 170141 .2099256 .1893823 .001 .9799851
Win Market
Total Trading Volume Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 85670 31.2845 53.52958 .002 1759.004
Lay-initiated Bets 86058 22.21862 42.0831 .004 2395.698
Implied Win Probability Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 85670 .1158333 .1162061 .0010101 .9752696
Lay-initiated Bets 86058 .1134978 .1156807 .001 .9615385
Place Market
Total Trading Volume Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 84143 5.215774 6.339611 .00246 157.1577
Lay-initiated Bets 84083 3.839365 5.163646 .002 89.16811
Implied Win Probability Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Back-initiated Bets 84143 .3126873 .1993981 .0016186 .9826381
Lay-initiated Bets 84083 .3086184 .1990493 .0010101 .9799851
Summary statistics on Betfair betting on the runners in 9,560 horse races in the U.K. between
the 24th March 2013 and the 19th March 2014. Win and place bets for each horse are used,
and back/lay -initiated bets are categorised by a variation of the Lee and Ready (1991)
algorithm described in Section 3. Total trading volume is measured in thousands of GBP,
and Implied Win Probability=1/(Odds + 1). Win and place market bets are pooled in the
top panel, and separated out in the middle and bottom panels.
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